One full academic year with CORE

I had used the CORE Project’s materials before for one semester courses. But this academic year I have covered the whole contents of the e-book “The Economy” from September to June. The group I taught has been the first cohort of a new degree on Contemporary History, Politics and Economics at my university (Autonomous University of Barcelona). Being an interdisciplinary degree fully taught in English, the students were highly motivated and many of them very participative.

Having shared and worked through all the units of “The Economy”, plus two of the experiments in the e-book “Experiencing Economics” I could more fully appreciate the coherence and richness of the contents. Macroeconomics is seen as an extension of microecnomics, and microeconomics is embedded in a debate about the great questions of our time, such as inequalities, institutions or climate change, in dialogue with other disciplines, such as natural sciences, politics, history or psychology.

Markets are a special case of social interactions (introduced using game theory), and perfectly competitive markets are an extreme and unusual case among many possible more or less competitive, efficient or inefficient markets. Economics is taught with references to what economists have been doing in the last 30 years, such as behavioral economics or Rodrik’s trilemma (I asked my students in the exam how would they solve the trilemma if they could choose: I can proudly say that no one proposed to exclude democracy…). All this can convince students that economics is useful and interesting without lowering the standards.

Perhaps in the future it would be useful to contrast it to other more traditional texts in an explicit way (eg on Aggregate Supply and minimum wages), because students find these materials in the net. The current materials can also be complemented with more on the European economy, populism and modern social choice, or evolutionary applications. Some materials I have barely used this time, I plan to use them more in the future, such as the Leibnizes and the Einsteins (parts that use more intensive mathematical tools), or the empirical projects of the e-book “Doing Economics”. The analytics of the classes, the exams and the exercises have focused on graphical models, but I believe that students should be helped to understand that mathematics is another useful language, and probably simpler than some other existing ones.

We have done many of the Exercises/Interactive Questions of the e-book “The Economy” in class, and the students have produced very interesting Essays/videos with cases related to the units of the e-book or related to supplementary materials such as the files on Covid-19.

Great experience, for wich instructors and students should be grateful to all those who contribute to the CORE Project.

A united Europe in fragmented world?

In my previous post I said that "once Ukraine is helped to survive and to reconstruct, the likely impact is a strengthened and more integrated European Union, which mutualizes the cost of economic aid to Ukraine and sanctions to Russia." It would also be desirable to advance to a more integrated world that addresses global challenges in a mutualistic and coordinated way, with an active participation of a united Europe. By global challenges I refer to climate change, tax competition, sustainable improvement of standards of living and migrations. 

A more federal and integrated Europe is likely but is not guaranteed. A more coordinated world is desirable but is not likely. However, it is not enough to have a more integrated Europe if in the long run we want to have a better world, even if we want to guarantee a minimum level of welfare for European citizens.

With the Covid-19 pandemic we could see the contrast between determined common action in the Euroean Union, and costly lack of determination at the global level. While the EU managed to buy and distribute vaccines in an exemplary exercise of planned allocation of resources across borders, most of the world in developing and poor countries could not benefit from vaccines (much less from investment funds such as those of the Next Generation plan).

As a result, most of Europe was quickly emerging from the Covid crisis before the Ukraine war, while the rest of the world is now panicking because of a food crisis to which it doesn’t have the tools to react, as a result of high debt and low growth.

As David Wallace-Wells recently pointed out, we face similar risks with climate change. European and other rich societies may well make progress with green investments, but we may not manage to scale the Green transition to the whole planet. The risk is then that average temperatures rise to levels that are tolerable for Europe for a while (that is, such that we still have the resources to adapt), while developing and poor countries cannot adapt and face catastrophic crises in terms of food, floodings and other disasters. The rich world will be able to keep stable standards of living for some decades, but in the long run it will be absorbed by refugee and migrant waves at unprecedented scale.

A complicated world beyond the borders of rich countries is meanwhile a temptation for the supply side of politics. Donald Trump has made it openly clear that his priority is to give weapons to teachers before sending aid to Ukraine. Expect more of this sort of explicit blindness to problems that are presented as belonging to others, but that will affect us sooner rather than later.

Global market and community failures must be optimally addressed with global policies and institutions, at least with global cooperation between the largest jurisdictions. Sometimes, even local market failures must be fixed with actions that transcend the nation-state. The example of baby formula in the US is a case in point. The solution to the crisis in the supply of products for babies (which originated as a domestic supply problem) came from an exercise in government planning and international cooperation: sending military airplanes to Germany to overcome the shortage of supply.

The impact of current disruptions on policies and institutions

Previous wars and crises have accelerated the creation of new institutions that have changed the lives of millions. After the 1930s Great Depression, the New Deal set up new federal instituions in the US that expanded the role of government. After the second World War, the lessons of the previous post-war were learned, and new global and European institutions were created to make peace and economic development compatible. The reaction to the Covid-19 crsis also learned from the mistakes of the (at least in Europe) flawed reaction to the global financial crisis. It took years for the EU to react with energy (“whatever it takes”) to the global financial crisis; it took months to react to the Covid-19 crisis, and it has taken days to react to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But in the long run, we must think about the likely impact and the desirable impact on our democratic infrastructure and how to make them coincide. In the short run there is a catastrophic impact on the Ukrainian economy (-35% growth estimated by IMF this year) and the need to plan for reconstruction in the mid run. Ukraine alone cannot handle this.

Once Ukraine is helped to survive and to reconstruct, the likely impact is a strengthened and more integrated European Union, which mutualizes the cost of economic aid to Ukraine and sanctions to Russia. Unfortunately, part of the likely impact is also a more fragmented world, where the EU is alone (perhaps helped by US administrations that are not hijacked by Putin allies such as Trump) supporting the rule of law.

The desirable impact is a more integrated and federal Europe in a more integrated world that addresses global challenges in a mutualistic way, such as climate change, tax competition, sustainable improvement of standards of living and migrations. How to make the likely and the desirable coincide will be a matter for global collective action and for evolutionary forces in a no longer linear progress.

The increasing difficulties of separating tasks in economics (between markets and governments, between fiscal and monetary policies, between different government levels, between politicians and technocrats) highlight the need to take an integrated approach, to put together the skills of many disciplines to tackle current challenges.

The logical next step after the national welfare state is the federal welfare state, as argued by Piketty in his last book, “A Brief History of Equality.” Some previous wars (the first world war, the Balkan wars, successive wars in the Middle east) ended with the sacralization of the nation-state and the consolidation of ethnocracies, paving the way for ethnic cleansing, future wars and economic stagnation. It is about time that we realize that multicultural democracies with universal rights, where respect for the rule of law is compatible with cross-border relations, are a much better way of sustaining economic development and sustainable peace.

A class experiment about investing in Venezuela and Switzerland

With the help of Erik Solé, a teaching assitant, I ran a class experiment (in my Introduction to Economics course at the new degree on Contemporary History, Politics and Economics at my University, UAB) using the instructions of the e-book “Experiencing Economics” of the CORE Project, based on the very useful Classex platform of experiments in class with mobile phones.

One of the experiments suggested by this e-book consists of asking students to play a “Coordination Game” where they have to decide whether to invest or not in pairs. It is a 2x2 game where they are randomly paired with another (unknown) student. They have 5 units of payoff to invest, and these 5 units become 10 only when both players invest. If you invest and your couple does not, you lose your 5 units.  Each pair is secretely told in the instructions that he or she is in one of two specific countries, one suggesting a narrative of stability and another one of instability. Instead of Germany and Greece (the countries originally suggested by the Classex platform, incidentally located in a German university), I changed the names of these two countries to Switzerland and Venezuela. I thought that the contrast of messages would be clearer in the current context. Britain and France after the Brexit referendum was another variation that is mentioned in the e-book to having been used by others previously -with similar results to our experiment.

The results of the experiment were striking, although in line with previous similar experiments.  77% of the pairs of students that received a message saying that they were in Switzerland, coordinated in the efficient outcome (both players invested), and none of them coincided in the non-investment outcome. In the rest of random pairs, one student invested and the other did not.

However, of those that were suggested to think that they were in Venezuela, only 22% of pairs coordinated in the joint investment outcome (although the payoffs were the same). 33% of these pairs coincided in choosing not to invest simultaneously, and in the rest of pairs, one student invested and the other did not.

77% versus 22% is a big difference, which I didn’t expect. It is consistent with similar games having been played in other universitites, according to the e-book “Experiencing Economics” of the CORE Project.

Experiments in class using smartphones are an engaging way to explain simple economic and game-theoretic models. Coordination is important, and narratives and expectations may help explain why it is challenging, and the absence or presence of trust may explain investment cycles and many other social and economic phenomena.

At our University, UAB, we will have in July a workshop to diffuse to other teaching Faculty the usefulness of these experiments and other ideas and resources to innovate in the teaching of Economics.

No shortcuts to shared prosperity

The negative supply shock derived from the war in Ukraine has the double effect of slowing economic growth and increasing inflation. All governments and relevant actors, such as central banks, are desperate to find solutions to avoid this double curse. Suddenly, everybody has become again aware of the dangers of slow (or zero, or even negative) growth, and the costs of inflation.

An intellectual victim of this double concern is what we could call the "modern economic extreme left," or at least part of it. Two principles of this segment of the left in the recent past have been de-growth and "modern monetary theory".

"De-growers" have been correctly emphasizing that economic growth at the cost of natural resources has a negative effect on individual and social welfare. But the extreme recipe of "de-growth" as a consequence of this concern would only make it more difficult to fund the necessary investments to fight climate change, or the international cooperation needed to reduce emissions in a balanced way. Now with the crisis, there is a general awareness that we need economic growth to make debt levels sustainable, to fund public expenditure needed to fight the social consequences of crises, and to create employment without generating undesirable inflationary pressures.

Modern monetary theory argues that "normal" government spending should be funded by money creation, which is something that can easily be done by central banks. There are of course more realistic variations of this, such as using the money-printing machine to give money to vulnerable groups in cases of emergency. The bottom line though is a relativization of the costs of money creation, in particular the relativization of the risks associated to inflation. The war in Ukraine (and the supply bottlenecks after two years of a global pandemic) are a reminder that inflation has not been defeated for good and that it is a danger that free money would only exacerbate. Just giving money to people would mean more money chasing the same amount of goods, creating artificial excess demand that would trigger price increases. It may be difficult to control inflation when prices start to rise and beliefs and expectations create a feedback loop from which it may be difficult to escape.

Intellectually, the times should be better for other more realistic segments of the progressive movement, for example for a modernized social-democracy, one that adds to the traditional objective of building a strong welfare state, the objectives of individual dignity and environmental sustainability (compatible with improving living standards) in an interconnected world.

A brief comment about "Spin Dictators," a book I recommend

In their new and very interesting book “Spin Dictators,” Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev argue that, if the dominant form of dictatorship in the XXth century was based on fear, open violence and human rights violations, the dominant one in the XXIst century is based on the manipulation of information, often keeping some democratic surface.

The book is based on their joint academic work, both theoretical and empirical. Their classification is plausible and, as they explain, should not be interpreted as a discrete taxonomy, but more as a continuum. The fact that “spin dictators” like Putin or Orban, keep some democratic forms, also suggests that the border between democracy and dictatorship has become fuzzy. In their defense of a liberal, rule-based democracy, they might as well be presenting their arguments to defeat, more generally, different forms of national-populism (although some spin dictatorships, like the Singaporean, do not fit with the national populist mold).

In the final part of the book, they try to answer this question: “How to respond to spin dictators?” Of course, this part is necessarily speculative, but in my view it is a very useful contribution to the necessary debate on how to improve democracies in a concerted global action.

They propose five principles:

1) Be more watchful. That is, never take for granted that a democracy is fully consolidated and be watchful for signs that democracies may be deteriorating. Perhaps this is a message to those that thought that democracy had come to stay in Russia and did business with Putin in an open way. Democracy is not only about voting, but also about respect for the rule of law and reasoned discussion.

2) Welcome modernization -even in our adversaries. Treisman and Guriev believe that if dictators hesitate to use fear and open violence, it is because of globalization and modernization. They believe that if globalization and modernization persist, spin dictators will necessarily evolve into democracies. I am not so sure of that, and I guess there is no way to be sure, but perhaps we should at least share this piece of wishful thinking.

3) Put our own house in order. That is, improve the functioning of the institutions of what we proudly call democracies, so that they can be an example that others want to follow, and introduce reforms that show to a great majority of people that democracies deliver what they promise. Here I would add a greater emphasis on reducing inequalities and fighting climate change at the same time, and in general a more critical stance about capitalism. The authors put a lot of hope on informed elites, but throughout history I am not sure that it has been these elites the ones who put their lives at risk to defend democracies.

4) Defend and reform the institutions of the liberal order, especially those at the international level, like the EU, NATO and the UN.

5) Support democracy democratically (not through the army), uniting around the idea of liberal democracy.

These are all useful ideas. They may be incomplete, but all of them are food for thought. I recommend this book.

Borders and soccer

In the last five centuries, the nation-state has become the most important form of political organization in the world, with important implications for economic and industrial organization (including the sports industries, where national teams, national federations and national tournaments play a key role). Since the end of the nineteenth century, empires and colonialism collapsed and resulted into many newly independent states, while at the same time there were attempts at political integration (the re-unified Germany, the European Union). One problem with the nation-state form of political organization is the constant and often violent questioning of borders. Today, small ethnically homogeneous countries coexist with muti-ethnic and diverse countries (as it could be seen in the final between Croatia –a former Yugoslav Republic- and France in the last World Cup). World Cups and other tournaments exhibit both national pride and global integration, sometimes with internationally mobile players on the pitch having difficulties to understand the (not always peaceful) feelings of the crowds.

Some examples of these border tensions are the US Civil War in the nineteenth century, which started with the secession attempts of Southern states, or the partition between India and Pakistan in the 1960s following the Independence of India from the British empire, which was accompanied by thousands of deaths and the forced displacement of millions of people, or the Independence of Ireland in the 1920’s, which was accompanied by the partition of the island of Ireland between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (with the latter belonging to the UK, and suffering violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities until the Good Friday Agreement of the late 1990s). A recent speech by the Kenyan ambassador to the UN warned about the risks of questioning existing borders, even acknowledging their unavoidable imperfection.

Since the end of the twentieth century, border disputes and re-drawing have not stopped. The Balkan wars in the 1990’s transformed the federal nation-state of Yugoslavia into a collection of republics, after a war with more than 100.000 deaths and millions of refugees. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was accompanied by the creation of new republics (such as Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Central Asian republics and others) that were previously integrated into the Soviet Union, or the partition of a previously communist country, Czechoslovakia, into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. All these movements have changed the organization of sports and soccer in particular, with the creation of new national teams and new leagues. The recent invasion of Ukraine by Putin’s Russia shows that the current status-quo is far from stable. According to American historian Timothy Snyder (in his book “The Road to Unfreedom”), many of these secession movements are not unrelated and reports about a policy (by the current regime in Russia) of advocating separatism in all countries except Russia itself (the South from the US, Scotland from Britain, Catalonia from Spain, Crimea and the Donbas region from Ukraine, any member-state from the EU…).

The European Union is the result of an integration project that started after the Second World War, to bring peace to Europe through economic integration. Although the UK was not among the founding members, it joined in the 1970s, but decided to leave (in the so-called Brexit) the club in a referendum in 2016, to become the first country to exit, with the Republic of Ireland remaining one of the current 27 member-states. The internationalization of the English soccer Premier League is difficult to understand without the free movement of workers and capital in the EU Single Market. Exiting this single market implies that now players joining a British club must do so under a “points system,” by which only top players over 18 years old can join. Some commentators have predicted that this will make the Premier League weaker. In any event, Brexit does not imply English teams leaving the Champions League (which is open to European teams out of the EU). 

The campaign for Catalonia to secede from Spain accelerated in 2012, after the main (until then) dominant moderate nationalist party joined the pro-independence forces. In 2017, an illegal secession referendum was called by the regional government on the basis of a set of decisions by the nationalist dominated regional Parliament which declared the rejection of the Spanish Constitution. After this, a dozen pro-independence leaders were arrested and judged, and six left the country. The Spanish government temporarirly suspended regional self-rule for some months, to be restored in the spring of 2018 with a newly elected regional government also led by pro-independence forces. Those that went to jail were pardoned by the Spanish government in 2021. The prospect of a Catalan national team or a Catalan league was not strong enough to culminate this now decaying campaign.