Democracy Is in Danger, and Not Only in the United States

Social scientists did not see it coming, but today democracy is clearly in danger in the United States of America. This is openly and honestly acknowledged by Adam Przeworski, one of the most prestigious political scientists, who for most of his career had forecast the stability and good health of democratic systems, especially in wealthy societies with a tradition of respecting the peaceful transfer of power. In a recent contribution, he acknowledges that he was wrong about the United States, but still considers it a “black swan,” insisting that democracy is surviving in many other places.

Other examples of complacency about the health of democratic systems include Acemoglu and Robinson’s famous 2012 book, Why Nations Fail, in which they presented the United States and the United Kingdom as examples of countries whose institutions should be emulated in order to preserve inclusive societies. Similarly, in Iversen and Soskice’s 2019 Democracy and Prosperity, they were still arguing that, despite the difficulties, advanced capitalist democracies would survive mainly because of the political support of an aspirational middle class. Today, one of these authors, Daron Acemoglu, is more pessimistic, as he makes clear in his new book, What Happened to Liberal Democracy.

I still believe that the democratic backlash can be stopped, but doing so will require more and better social science at the highest levels. It will also require acknowledging that democracy is not only in danger in the United States. Today, several Latin American countries are ruled by followers of Donald Trump, and they receive direct political and financial support from the current US administration. This administration has also clearly and officially stated that its “national security” strategy includes supporting “patriotic” parties in Europe, meaning far-right, xenophobic parties such as those threatening the democratic future of the European Union in France, Germany, Spain and Italy, and, now outside the EU, the United Kingdom.

There is a direct link between disruptive national populism and threats to democracy. The success of insurgent political movements is due in part to their promise of “commitments,” as Italian scholar Massimo Morelli calls them: a promise to implement shocking policies—such as the deportation of immigrants, arbitrary tariffs, or anti-science measures—in a transparent and straightforward manner. Such policies usually require the removal of checks and balances. And this happens in a dynamically self-reinforcing way: causing economic pain generates more fear and distrust, which in turn increases support for such disastrous policies, creating pressure for the further removal of checks and balances. The process can continue until the seemingly civilised, if heterodox, conservative leader initially supported by business leaders becomes a monster like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador.

The vicious circle can be stopped, but it is easier to do so at the beginning, before we have sold these “promising” leaders to the public as benevolent figures. There was a recent article in The New York Times, for example, that portrayed in relatively benign terms an emerging xenophobic leader in Catalonia, expressing surprise that a Catalan nationalist could share the same discriminatory ideas as the AfD in Germany or the National Front in France. According to the author, the surprise stems from the progressive past of Catalan nationalism.

Well, no. Although Catalan nationalism contains a progressive branch—and one that is not free of contradictions—it has also contained conservative, reactionary and fascist components, both in the past and today. It is no coincidence that the Catalan bourgeoisie was divided, to put it generously, between those who supported Franco’s fascist dictatorship and those who opposed it.

Infantino's Retreat and the Limits of Football Plutocracy

FIFA President Gianni Infantino withdrew his proposal to partially privatize the World Cup probably not because he genuinely believed that European teams would boycott the tournament. The more likely reason is that he realized he was losing support for his reelection as FIFA president. He may still fail to secure another term, but had he persisted with the proposal, defeat would have been almost certain.

Europe has once again shown that, when it acts in unity, it can be a formidable force, even against an adversary closely aligned with Trump. Infantino's proposal became associated with privatization and Trump-style corruption, both of which are deeply unpopular in Europe. Public opinion reacted in much the same way as it did to the proposed European Super League (ESL) a few years ago.

There is, of course, a degree of hypocrisy on the part of European federations and clubs, which have themselves been involved in blatant acts of privatization and corruption in the recent past. The mixture of non-profit and for-profit organizations that characterizes football will remain vulnerable to corruption as long as democratic public authorities are kept at arm's length and there is no global public regulator. Large democratic jurisdictions—today, perhaps only the European Union—can nevertheless act as an important constraint.

FIFA's peculiar democratic structure appears to have convinced Infantino that he could push ahead with plans that would enrich both himself and the Trump family while sharing part of the spoils with the smaller national federations, all of which formally enjoy the same voting power as the wealthiest and most influential federations.

A World Cup without European teams is probably a credible threat, provided European unity is maintained. I am not entirely convinced that European federations would have remained united all the way to the end, but this time unity, backed by public opinion, proved sufficient.

Would the national federations themselves have maintained their cohesion? One can easily imagine, for example, Spanish fans and players putting pressure on their federation to participate in the World Cup.

FIFA controls the World Cup. Football is the world's most global and institutionally unified sport, and there is enormous demand for tournaments of this kind. It would not be the same if there were two competing World Cups and two different world champions.

International governing bodies such as FIFA and UEFA face an inherent conflict of interest because they are both regulators and commercial promoters. They also compete with one another to control the tournaments that attract the largest audiences. Each seeks to maximize the overall value of the game while securing the largest possible share of the revenues for itself.

European federations, European institutions, and, above all, European public opinion place significant limits on the influence of global plutocracy over football because Europe remains the dominant force in the sport. If Europeans were equally dominant in semiconductors or artificial intelligence, they would wield comparable influence in those fields as well.

Corruption and success are perfectly compatible. Indeed, success attracts tycoons and other actors seeking to capture rents. The European Super League project and Infantino's failed attempt to partially privatize the World Cup both reveal the institutional fragility and instability of global football governance, despite the sport's extraordinary success.