The rhetoric of reaction against the Global Progressive Mobilization (GPM)

Last week in Barcelona, progressives gathered at the GPM. Under the leadership of European social democracy—and in particular of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez—leaders and representatives from parties, think tanks, and labor unions across all continents reaffirmed their commitment to democracy, peace, and a multilateral order.

Despite having lost ground in recent years (while still remaining one of the pillars sustaining the European Union), social democrats uniquely retain the ability to convene such a broad and diverse gathering. Not everyone who defends democracy is on the left, and some on the left have not always defended democracy. Yet all those present in Barcelona did so, and those there in power have attained office through democratic means and upheld democratic institutions. At a time when democracy is under attack, the democratic left mobilized to defend it: European social democrats, the U.S. Democratic Party (including its progressive wing), and democratic forces from Latin America—including leaders not rooted in social democracy, such as Chilean former president Gabriel Boric.

Some actors would have liked to participate, and most criticism has focused on omissions—of people, forces, or topics. However, there was a clear urgency to mobilize the left around a coherent set of ideas. Should engagement also extend to the moderate center-right? In practice, it already does—in Brussels, and in countries such as Hungary and Poland. Presidents representing around 60% of Latin America’s population—including those of Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Colombia, as well as Chile’s former president—were present in Barcelona. Seen in this light, and with South Africa represented by its president, the left appears less weak than is often assumed. Particularly significant is the growing alliance with the progressive wing of the U.S. Democratic Party, whose role is increasingly recognized—for example, by Barack Obama, who recently appeared alongside New York City Mayor Zoran Mamdani.

Criticism of the Barcelona meeting has come, for instance, from Karl Rove in The Wall Street Journal. His reaction, along with that of parts of the Spanish right, echoes Giorgia Meloni’s response last year to the pro-European demonstration in Rome, where she dismissed the Ventotene Manifesto—a document advocating a democratic and federal Europe even before the end of World War II. In The Rhetoric of Reaction, Albert O. Hirschman argues that conservative critiques of progressive reforms tend to follow three recurring patterns: the perversity thesis (reforms will backfire), the futility thesis (reforms will fail to produce meaningful change), and the jeopardy thesis (reforms will endanger past achievements). These arguments reappear across history—from reactions to the French Revolution to debates on modern welfare states—suggesting that political discourse is often shaped less by new evidence than by enduring rhetorical strategies. The authors of the Ventotene Manifesto ultimately proved more prescient than their critics, both in the 1940s and today. Notably, Hirschman himself had a family connection to one of its authors.

Some suggestions for improving the GPM are valid—see, for example, proposals by Jeremy Cliffe. These include making the forum a regular and permanent fixture (a “left-wing Davos”), strengthening ties with academia, and developing a more compelling economic narrative. The self-criticism expressed by Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is also warranted—though without discarding the achievements of the past.

At the same time, it is entirely justified for the democratic left to mobilize globally in response to the international coordination of the far right. Today’s democratic backlash is driven in part by oligarchic capture, with racism often deployed as both instrument and justification. Electoral integrity itself is under strain in the United States. Political scientist Larry Bartels has shown that, in a January 2020 survey, a majority of Republicans agreed that “the traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it,” while more than 40% believed that “a time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands.” 

Democracy should not be the monopoly of the left, and the left has not always upheld it consistently. However, the most significant threat today comes from a right increasingly aligned with oligarchic interests. Among Republican voters, the strongest predictor of anti-democratic attitudes is ethnic antagonism—particularly concerns about the political influence and access to public resources of immigrants, African Americans, and Latinos. This highlights the central role of ethnic conflict in contemporary U.S. politics, with parallels emerging in parts of the European right.

Those with economic and political power in conservative circles in both the United States and Europe bear a particular responsibility to halt the democratic backsliding. Meanwhile, the left—whether in the streets of Minneapolis or in political gatherings such as Barcelona—is already playing its part.

After nations, global peace

In "After Nations," Rana Dasgupta offers an original history—and critique—of the nation-state as an institution, contrasting it with empires and other political forms. The book is rich in insight and erudition, and it has been reviewed in outlets such as Financial Times and Foreign Policy, as well as in Branko Milanovic’s Substack, each highlighting different dimensions of the work.

The essay is structured in four main parts, each linking a historical empire to a concept central to the organization of political institutions. The first part connects the history of France with the concepts of God and theology, which have historically served to justify the power of both nations and empires. The second associates England with money, emphasizing the central role of finance and the unequal distribution of economic resources in the development of governing institutions. The third links the United States to law, illustrating how the dominance of money has been reinforced by legal frameworks that prioritize property rights. Finally, the fourth part examines the long continuity of the continental Chinese empire—sustained in part by communism—and its enduring influence beyond its borders, relating it to environmental constraints and the ways in which human–nature relationships shape systems of power.

The book is particularly compelling in its exposition of the darker side of the Anglo-American empire. As Milanovic observes in his review:

“Reading Dasgupta’s, and similar books that abound today, one cannot but be totally struck [by] how the contrary narratives of the British rise and the Industrial Revolution, some ‘crowned’ by the Nobel Prizes, succeed in almost completely erasing the aspects of domestic and foreign terrorism, enslavement, beatings, outright piracy, compression into Navy services, enclosures, fabulous enrichment of political elites, military suppression of revolts, famines and executions under the beautifully sounding title of ‘Glorious Revolution’. ‘The Glorious Revolution—Dasgupta writes—inaugurated the modern state in its raw form: an undemocratic commercial machine that unleashed terror at home and abroad’ (p. 113). Eliding this truth is like describing Soviet industrialization and the Great Terror by studying Moscow parades. But nobody has received a Nobel Prize for that. Well, perhaps the Stalin Prize…”

Dasgupta uses this historical analysis to argue that the currently dominant nation-state is a relatively recent contingency—one that may already have passed its peak in terms of its capacity to address contemporary global challenges. Today, only a minority of nation-states can be considered successful, and even those that provide reasonable standards of living are increasingly threatened by more dysfunctional or aggressive ones. The brief period during which some nation-states have prospered is overshadowed by the many instances of ethnic cleansing, genocide, invasion, and war that continue to shape global politics.

The selective application of the principle of self-determination—advanced by Woodrow Wilson at the end of the World War I—was arguably inevitable, since “peoples” overlap and cannot be neatly divided into territorially bounded units. It is impossible to partition the Earth into discrete fragments to which such a right can be cleanly applied. Today, national sovereignty is increasingly challenged by technological multinationals, transnational terrorism, and more benign and promising arrangements such as international treaties (for example, those governing Antarctica).

In some cases, societies have developed more flexible and constructive arrangements: Jerusalem as a shared international city; Northern Ireland as a space jointly governed by Catholics and Protestants; or South Africa as a society shared among Black, white, and other communities. Only the most rigid positions insist on strict partition in such contexts. From this perspective, the idea that the Palestinian question can be resolved through the further proliferation of nation-states—especially in an already fragile Middle Eastern (or “West Asian,” in Dasgupta’s terms) context—appears misguided.

The European Union stands out as a project on which alternative political forms might be built, although it remains imperfect and nation-states continue to exercise significant power within its governance structures.

A world dominated by nation-states is failing to deliver global peace, advanced democracy, or a sustainable and egalitarian economy. Today, only a small fraction of the world’s population lives in genuine democracies, while others survive through niches such as money laundering or narcotrafficking. 

After the four main sections, the book concludes with two shorter chapters: one exploring possible alternatives to the nation-state, and another attempting to define it. The discussion of alternatives is, understandably, somewhat unsatisfying, reflecting the difficulty of reconciling what is desirable with what is feasible.

Ultimately, it is likely that the evolution of unpredictable historical processes will determine the forms that replace the nation-state. The final chapter, devoted to defining the institution itself, is particularly incisive in highlighting its internal contradictions—for example, the impossibility of defining “pure” nations or of identifying states that truly monopolize violence. As things stand, nation-states concentrate too much power, often enabling harmful outcomes. We should move toward something better—although doing so entails the risk of something worse.